Wilful hermeneutical ignorance to the (qualified) rescue of knowledge-first

This chapter argues that knowledge-first gets somewhat unexpected, albeit qualified support from thinking about epistemically unjust phenomena such as so-called wilful hermeneutical ignorance, the deliberate ignorance of the epistemic resources of the oppressed. The argument is this: one of the most unpalatable consequences of knowledge-first is that factors beyond our ken can determine our beliefs' normative status. Although knowledge-firsters have ways of dealing with this hurdle-by distinguishing between justification and excuse-many have remained unconvinced. By now, the back-and-forth has grown sufficiently involved to merit looking for an arbiter from outside the debate. This is what this chapter provides. It shows that the only way to think of wilfully ignorant belief as unjustified is by appealing to some factors beyond the ignoramus's ken. Thus, knowledge-first is shown to get the epistemic and moral contours of the phenomena better than at least some of its competitors-the internalist ones.