Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

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5 Citations (Scopus)


Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)141-152
Number of pages12
JournalSouth African Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2008
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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