Transcending Imperialist/Sub-Imperialist Partnerships

At a time of extreme political volatility, various multilateral sites of decision-making are no longer effective for solving world problems. Prior generations of global-scale deals had included a 1987 chlorofluorocarbon ban to halt ozone-hole deterioration, a 2002 medicines fund for AIDS, and—reflecting both financial power and vulnerability—the coordinated 2008–11 G20 financial bailouts. By the early 2020s, the Covid-19 pandemic showed that in spite of Quantitative Easing (printing money) and mild Keynesian income distribution by rich countries, there was no concept of global public goods. So ‘vaccine apartheid’ reflected the refusal of Britain and Germany to waive Intellectual Property on medicines. Even though there were two leaders of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa bloc (from Pretoria and New Delhi) fighting the West, the BRICS were in most instances assimilated into the existing multilateral institutions and global value chains. In 2014 they created a sole alternative institution, the New Development Bank, but it was a replica of a conservative Western financier, joining banking sanctions against 20% owner Russia due to the risk of a downgrade by New York credit ratings agencies. In crucial areas of finance, trade, investment and climate policy, imperial/sub-imperial partnerships were not ameliorations but instead amplifications of polycrisis.