TY - GEN
T1 - The Legal Pitfalls to Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime
AU - Watney, Murdoch
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Curran Associates Inc.. All rights reserved.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - A safe and secure digital space benefits all countries. The growth and development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are now moving at such a fast pace that keeping up with the threats that ICTs present to businesses, governments, and individuals necessitate a response on an international level. As far back as the early 2000’s, the Council of Europe recognised the threat that cybercrime presents to a safe and secure internet. It adopted a multilateral Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) in 2001 which came into effect in 2004. Since its adoption 68 countries have ratified it, but the Budapest Convention never achieved ratification on a global level, with the unfortunate consequence that a void existed on international level. As the risks to the cybersecurity landscape escalated, it became apparent that critical issues such as international consensus on which behaviour in cyberspace should be criminalised, how cooperation in the investigation of crime and sharing of evidence should be achieved, had to be addressed by the United Nations (UN). It is against this background that the first international Convention against Cybercrime is explored. The Convention traces its roots back to a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) vote in 2019, when Russia challenged the Budapest Convention calling for an international framework to address cybercrime. Such a call was supported by BRICS nations and other developing countries but some Western countries were not enthusiastic. Following an arduous 5 year negotiation process, the UNGA adopted the Convention against Cybercrime on 24 December 2024. he adoption of the Convention may be a landmark achievement, but it cannot be considered a victory if the key players do not ratify it. For example, the United States’ (US) tech sector holds most of the world’s data and if the US does not ratify it, it will impact negatively on the operational value of the Convention. Furthermore, if countries decide not to ratify, it may heighten geo-political tension. The discussion highlights the objections and reservations to the Convention against Cybercrime, whether the concerns are justifiable and the possible impact of non-ratification.
AB - A safe and secure digital space benefits all countries. The growth and development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are now moving at such a fast pace that keeping up with the threats that ICTs present to businesses, governments, and individuals necessitate a response on an international level. As far back as the early 2000’s, the Council of Europe recognised the threat that cybercrime presents to a safe and secure internet. It adopted a multilateral Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) in 2001 which came into effect in 2004. Since its adoption 68 countries have ratified it, but the Budapest Convention never achieved ratification on a global level, with the unfortunate consequence that a void existed on international level. As the risks to the cybersecurity landscape escalated, it became apparent that critical issues such as international consensus on which behaviour in cyberspace should be criminalised, how cooperation in the investigation of crime and sharing of evidence should be achieved, had to be addressed by the United Nations (UN). It is against this background that the first international Convention against Cybercrime is explored. The Convention traces its roots back to a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) vote in 2019, when Russia challenged the Budapest Convention calling for an international framework to address cybercrime. Such a call was supported by BRICS nations and other developing countries but some Western countries were not enthusiastic. Following an arduous 5 year negotiation process, the UNGA adopted the Convention against Cybercrime on 24 December 2024. he adoption of the Convention may be a landmark achievement, but it cannot be considered a victory if the key players do not ratify it. For example, the United States’ (US) tech sector holds most of the world’s data and if the US does not ratify it, it will impact negatively on the operational value of the Convention. Furthermore, if countries decide not to ratify, it may heighten geo-political tension. The discussion highlights the objections and reservations to the Convention against Cybercrime, whether the concerns are justifiable and the possible impact of non-ratification.
KW - Budapest convention
KW - Objections to the convention against cybercrime
KW - Operational effect of non-ratification on the convention against cybercrime
KW - United Nations Convention against cybercrime
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105014925757
U2 - 10.34190/eccws.24.1.3381
DO - 10.34190/eccws.24.1.3381
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105014925757
T3 - European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS
SP - 713
EP - 719
BT - Proceedings of the 24th European Conference on CyberWarfare and Security, ECCWS 2025
A2 - Lipps, Christoph
A2 - Han, Bin
PB - Curran Associates Inc.
T2 - 24th European Conference on CyberWarfare and Security, ECCWS 2025
Y2 - 26 June 2025 through 27 June 2025
ER -