The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups

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5 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.

Original languageEnglish
Article number47
JournalAsian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2022


  • Collective reasons
  • Collective responsibility
  • Epistemic injustice
  • Epistemic reasons
  • Epistemic responsibility
  • Social identity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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