TY - GEN
T1 - The Agency Theory and State-Owned Companies
T2 - 6th International Conference of Accounting and Business, iCAB 2025
AU - Shiburi, Khazamula Stephen
AU - Marx, Benjamin
AU - Smiith, Rozanne
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2026.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - The literature is replete with studies using the agency theory to examine the relationship between shareholders and executives of private entities. However, few researchers have applied the agency theory to state-owned entities. Against this background, this study examines key agency theory issues within schedule two state-owned entities in South Africa, including identifying agents and principals, information asymmetry, conflicts of interest, and differences in risk attitudes. The study approach takes the form of a snowballing systematic literature review of articles published in peer-reviewed journals that were indexed in the Scopus databases. This study finds that South African citizens are the principals of schedule two state-owned entities, whilst the government and executives are agents. In addition, there is evidence supporting conflicting interests, information asymmetry, and differential risk attitudes between the government, executives, and the public in the South African schedule two state-owned entities. This study provides evidence of agency problems in South African schedule two state-owned entities, offering insights for policymakers on governance reforms to enhance accountability and efficiency.
AB - The literature is replete with studies using the agency theory to examine the relationship between shareholders and executives of private entities. However, few researchers have applied the agency theory to state-owned entities. Against this background, this study examines key agency theory issues within schedule two state-owned entities in South Africa, including identifying agents and principals, information asymmetry, conflicts of interest, and differences in risk attitudes. The study approach takes the form of a snowballing systematic literature review of articles published in peer-reviewed journals that were indexed in the Scopus databases. This study finds that South African citizens are the principals of schedule two state-owned entities, whilst the government and executives are agents. In addition, there is evidence supporting conflicting interests, information asymmetry, and differential risk attitudes between the government, executives, and the public in the South African schedule two state-owned entities. This study provides evidence of agency problems in South African schedule two state-owned entities, offering insights for policymakers on governance reforms to enhance accountability and efficiency.
KW - Agency theory
KW - Conflict of interest
KW - Information asymmetry
KW - Principal and agent
KW - Risk-attitude
KW - South Africa
KW - State-owned entities
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105031739784
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-032-13384-7_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-032-13384-7_24
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105031739784
SN - 9783032133830
T3 - Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics
SP - 339
EP - 353
BT - Embracing Technological Agility in Accounting and Business – Vol. 2 - Proceedings of the 6th International Conference of Accounting and Business iCAB, Cape Town 2025
A2 - Moloi, Tankiso
PB - Springer Nature
Y2 - 19 June 2025 through 20 June 2025
ER -