More and the possibility of a non-humanist black existentialism

Existentialism has progressively fallen out of favour in contemporary philosophy departments, as well as in the broader cultural discourse. David Mitchell posits that its diminishing appeal can, in part, be attributed to the naïve, humanist view of the subject with which it has become associated. In this context, what can then be said of the fate of the work of Mabogo P. More, the foremost advocate of existentialism among the black South African philosophical tradition? I provide a reading of More’s distinct brand of existentialism, contending that, as articulated by More himself, his existentialism may be regarded as a “humanist endeavour”, yet one advocating for “a novel humanism” reminiscent of “Fanonian revolutionary humanism”. Consequently, I suggest that More’s existentialism retains its relevance amid the waning interest in existentialism, principally due to the distinctively relational conception of humanism that I contend grounds it.