Group Knowledge Attributions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A view growing in popularity in current philosophical literature is the 'reliable informant view of knowledge attributions' (RIVKA), according to which the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify/flag reliable informants. One feature of our knowledge ascriptions that has gone largely unnoticed in this literature, however, is that knowledge is attributed, not only to individuals, but also to groups. This observation can be combined with the RIVKA, resulting in the following group version of the view: G-RIVKA: the purpose of group knowledge attributions is to identify/flag reliable informants. The chapter argues that the G-RIVKA, and therefore the RIVKA, is false. It proposes alternatives to both the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA, the 'reliable source of information view of knowledge attributions' - the RSIVKA - and its group counterpart - the G-RSIVKA - according to which a central purpose of knowledge attributions, individual or group, is to identify/flag reliable sources of information.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKnowledge Ascriptions
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191741265
ISBN (Print)9780199693702
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Sept 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Group belief
  • Group knowledge
  • Group knowledge attributions
  • Reliable informant
  • Reliable testifier

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities

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