Dispositions and the principle of least action revisited

Benjamin T.H. Smart; Karim P.Y. Thébault

doi:10.1093/analys/anv050

Dispositions and the principle of least action revisited

Benjamin T.H. Smart, Karim P.Y. Thébault

Philosophy

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Some time ago, Joel Katzav (2004. Dispositions and the principle of least action. Analysis 64: 206-14; 2005. Ellis on the limitations of dispositionalism. Analysis 65: 92-4) and Brian Ellis (2005. Katzav on the limitations of dispositionalism. Analysis 65: 90-2) debated the compatibility of dispositional essentialism with the principle of least action. Surprisingly, very little has been said on the matter since, even by the most naturalistically inclined metaphysicians. Here, we revisit the Katzav-Ellis arguments of 2004-05. We outline the two problems for the dispositionalist identified Katzav in his 2004 (we call these the 'contingent action-quantities' and 'explanatory' objections), and claim they are not as problematic for the dispositional essentialist at it first seems - but not for the reasons espoused by Ellis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	386-395
Number of pages	10
Journal	Analysis
Volume	75
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv050
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2015

Keywords

Bird
Disposition
Ellis
Explanation
Katzav
Laws of Nature
Principle of least action

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1093/analys/anv050

Cite this

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Dispositions and the principle of least action revisited

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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