Disease as a theoretical concept: The case of "HPV-itis"

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4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

If there is any value in the idea that disease is something other than the mere absence of health then that value must lie in the way that diseases are classified. This paper offers further development of a view advanced previously, the Contrastive Model of Disease: it develops the account to handle asymptomatic disease (previously excluded); and in doing so it relates the model to a broadly biostatistical view of health (where before the model was neutral in the naturalism debate). The developments are prompted by considering cancers featuring viruses as prominent causes, since these appear to amount to cases where the prescriptions of the Contrastive Model could be followed, but aren't. The resulting Irrelevance Objection claims that the Contrastive Model is irrelevant to medical science and practice. The paper seeks to rebut the Irrelevance Objection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)250-257
Number of pages8
JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
Volume48
Issue numberPB
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2014

Keywords

  • Cancer
  • Contrastive model of disease
  • Disease
  • Health
  • HPV
  • Virus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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