TY - JOUR
T1 - Corruption and ethnicity in Africa
T2 - the moderating role of institutional quality
AU - Bonga-Bonga, Lumengo
AU - Kirsten, Frederich
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - This paper investigates how ethnic group affiliation and institutional quality jointly shape individual corruption experiences across 33 African countries, using Afrobarometer Round 8 survey data and a probit modelling framework. While existing literature recognises the link between ethnic fragmentation and corruption, limited attention has been paid to how institutional quality conditions this relationship. The findings demonstrate that members of influential ethnic groups are less likely to encounter corruption in weak institutional environments, where extortive practices disproportionately target less powerful groups. However, as institutional quality—measured via rule of law—improves, this pattern reverses: influential groups show a higher likelihood of collusive corruption, exploiting enhanced institutional structures for strategic cooperation and illicit gain. A threshold analysis reveals a regime shift at the average level of institutional quality. Robustness checks using multilevel mixed-effects logistic models confirm these dynamics. The results underscore the importance of considering ethnic power asymmetries when designing governance and anti-corruption reforms.
AB - This paper investigates how ethnic group affiliation and institutional quality jointly shape individual corruption experiences across 33 African countries, using Afrobarometer Round 8 survey data and a probit modelling framework. While existing literature recognises the link between ethnic fragmentation and corruption, limited attention has been paid to how institutional quality conditions this relationship. The findings demonstrate that members of influential ethnic groups are less likely to encounter corruption in weak institutional environments, where extortive practices disproportionately target less powerful groups. However, as institutional quality—measured via rule of law—improves, this pattern reverses: influential groups show a higher likelihood of collusive corruption, exploiting enhanced institutional structures for strategic cooperation and illicit gain. A threshold analysis reveals a regime shift at the average level of institutional quality. Robustness checks using multilevel mixed-effects logistic models confirm these dynamics. The results underscore the importance of considering ethnic power asymmetries when designing governance and anti-corruption reforms.
KW - Africa
KW - Corruption
KW - ethinicity
KW - probit model
KW - quality of institutions
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105025676921
U2 - 10.1080/21665095.2025.2606691
DO - 10.1080/21665095.2025.2606691
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105025676921
SN - 2166-5095
VL - 13
JO - Development Studies Research
JF - Development Studies Research
IS - 1
M1 - 2606691
ER -