A quasi-pragmatist explanation of our ethics of belief

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Most of us accept epistemic norms: we are moved by them when we form, maintain, and revise our beliefs. One symptom of this acceptance is our deference to epistemic criticism. But why do we accept epistemic norms? I argue that we do so as a constitutive part of having intentions. The argument is that intention constitutively requires curiosity about the world; and acceptance of epistemic norms comes for free with this curiosity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)113-130
Number of pages18
JournalTeorema
Volume28
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Epistemic norms
  • Ethics of belief
  • Intention
  • Norm-acceptance
  • Pragmatism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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