A principal-agent theory perspective on PPP risk allocation

Asheem Shrestha, Jolanta Tamošaitiene, Igor Martek, M. Reza Hosseini, David J. Edwards

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study proposes a framework for the allocation of risk in public private partnerships (PPP) projects. Its contribution lies in the recognition and incorporation of risks introduced by project stakeholders, and as articulated by the principal-agent theory (PAT). The framework assesses risks and routes these risks to those parties best equipped to mitigate their impact on the project. This allocation of risk is facilitated by a thirteen-step process. The practical benefit of this study lies in outlining a clear, systematic method for allocating risk efficiently to both the government and private enterprise parties of the project. In so doing, risk mitigation can be expected to improve project performance, optimize stakeholder goals, and enhance sustainability objectives, including improved operational life-cycle efficiency and elevated social and community benefits.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6455
JournalSustainability
Volume11
Issue number22
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • PPP
  • Principal-agent theory
  • Public private partnerships
  • Risk allocation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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