Abstract
Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: (1) inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and (2) truth inherits some of its value from the value of inquiry. This makes truth finally but extrinsically valuable, a thesis that to my knowledge has not been directly defended in the literature. I support (1) by appeal to the notion of epistemic injustice, and (2) through the surprising claim that some goals get their value from the pursuit that aims at them.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1911-1933 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Erkenntnis |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2023 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- Logic